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1.  Introduction 
Pricing strategies for parcels delivery from e-commerce remain a hot topic for postal and parcel 
delivery operators. As shown by Borsenberger (2015), the e-commerce sector is subject to 
concentration trends, due to a fierce price competition between e-retailers, the existence of 
increasing returns to scale in e-commerce activity, the importance of e-retailers’ reputation to 
attract consumers.  
This phenomenon is reinforced by the development of ‘marketplaces’, which represent 
virtual intermediate platforms between e-retailers and e-consumers. Marketplaces have 
developed a win-win intermediation model. Consumers enjoy a greater variety of products 
(long-tail) and affiliated merchants take advantage of the marketplace’s ability to generate huge 
online traffic and to provide a powerful showcase.1 Affiliation to a marketplace presents also 
some drawbacks for e-retailers. These include fierce price competition leading to reduced 
margins, the dilution of their own identity and brand to the benefit of the marketplace and in a 
worst case scenario the creation of a relation of dependence.  
The concentration phenomenon raises specific concerns for parcel delivery operators, as 
input providers for e-retailers. Big e-retailers could have substantial power to negotiate 
attractive commercial terms for the provision of parcel delivery services in a market 
characterized by fixed costs and returns to scale. Specifically, this may lead to volume-discount 
pricing schemes.  
This trend is exacerbated by the fact that the major marketplaces provide delivery 
services to their affiliated merchants.2 They become a sort of parcel aggregators, maximizing 
the volume of parcels provided to delivery operators, in order to increase their quantity 
discounts.  
To put further pressure on parcel delivery operators, big e-retailers like Amazon are 
developing their own delivery network in dense areas, threatening to bypass traditional delivery 
operators.  
                                                 
1 The activity of marketplaces is growing in all countries where e-commerce is well-developed. In 2013, 2 million 
sellers were affiliated to Amazon’s marketplace around the world, selling more than 1 billion items. In France, 
according to Oxatis (2014), 32 percent of e-retailers sold their goods through marketplaces in 2013. According to 
the FEVAD (2014), the volume of sales realized in marketplaces increased by 42 percent in the last quarter 2013 
and represented 16 percent of the global activity of these e-retailers. The five first most visited e-commerce sites in 
France were marketplaces. 
2 For example, Amazon proposes to its affiliated merchants the service ‘Fulfilment by Amazon’ (FBA). Merchants 
pay fees for the various services provided by Amazon: handling the order, picking and packing products, shipping 
the order (fees depending on the parcel weight and size and the value of order; see Appendix A). Rakuten.com 
offer a similar storage and shipping service to merchants affiliated to its marketplace: Rakuten Super Logistics 
(RSL). 
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In this paper, we examine the link between the delivery rates charged by postal and 
other parcel delivery operators and the e-commerce market structure. What is the impact of the 
existence of a marketplace (vs. the presence of independent e-retailers) on the delivery rates and 
on the economic surplus? Could a delivery operator prevent the development of a marketplace 
with an appropriate pricing strategy? Which is the best situation from the point of view of the 
various economic agents (e-retailers, delivery operators, final consumers)?  
To answer these questions, we develop a formal model, in Section 2, in which we 
consider a stylized e-commerce sector with a single parcel delivery operator and two retailers, 
indexed 0 and 1. Retailer 0 is a “big” retailer who also operates a marketplace platform, which 
sells retail and delivery services to other firms.  
Initially, we assume that all items are delivered by the postal operator but we also 
consider the case where operator 0 has a bypass technology, at least in some areas. Retailer 1 
can sell independently or via the other firm’s marketplace. When it sells independently it uses 
the delivery services provided by the postal operator and pays the rate it charges. In case of 
marketplace affiliation it pays a fee to the other retailer who takes care of parcels delivery. 
Joining the marketplace has other implications. It reduces the degree of product differentiation 
(so that competition intensity increases) and it increases the willingness to pay for retailer 1’s 
product. This is because the retailers benefit from the reputation of the marketplace.  
We study the case where the delivery operator sets the rates charged to each of the two 
sellers to maximize profits and also look at the Ramsey solution (maximization of welfare 
subject to a break-even constraint). All variables are evaluated in the induced subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the price competition game played by the retailers. Depending on the fee 
charged by the marketplace, operator 1 decides to join or not. In the last stage, the retailers then 
compete in prices either as independent retailers (Subgame I) or as marketplace sellers 
(Subgame M).  
In Section 3, we determine analytically the solution to these games considering as 
reference scenario the case where all the players maximize their profits and the case where the 
postal operator maximizes social welfare. While we adopt the simplest possible model which is 
consistent with the main stylized features of the underlying problem, the analytical solutions are 
often quite complex. The interpretation is interesting in itself, but to obtain sharper conclusions 
we resort to numerical simulations in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
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2  Model 
Consider an electronic retail market consisting of two sellers (e-retailers) located at 0  and 1 
of the Hotelling line. Consumers are distributed over this line, with [0 1]z  . Let ( )G z  denote 
the distribution function and ( )g z  the density. The Hotelling specification is the simplest way 
to represent horizontal differentiation. In our setting, z  is not meant to describe a geographical 
location but rather a parameter characterizing the individuals’ preferences across retailers.  
The retailers sell a single product which apart from their specific retail services is 
otherwise homogenous. Its marginal cost, excluding delivery is constant and denoted by k .  
There is a single delivery operator, who charges a rate of 0r  to retailer 0 . For the time 
being bypass is ruled out but will be considered below. Seller 1 can either deliver directly via 
postal operator at rate r ; the general rate which also applies for single piece senders. 
Alternatively, it can “join” the marketplace and use the delivery services of retailer 0 . This 
affects utility and also the degree of product differentiation. We will consider these two market 
configurations separately.  
2.1 Independent delivery 
In this case referred to as subgame I , the utility of consumer z , who buys x  units of the 
good is given by 
 
2
0
2
1
( ) if the good is sold by firm 0
( ) (1 ) if the good is sold by firm1
u x p x tz
u x p x t z
      
 (1) 
where 1  . Firm 0 is a “big” retailer, whose reputation translates into a higher quality 
perceived by the consumer, which is captured by  . Define indirect utility (consumer surplus) 
as 
 ( ) max ( )
x
v q u x qx      (2) 
The marginal consumer 0 1( 1 )z p p    is defined by 
  
ݒሺߙ, ݌଴ሻ െ ݐ̂ݖଶ ൌ ݒሺ1, ݌ଵሻ െ ݐሺ1 െ ̂ݖሻଶ 
This consumer is indifferent between buying from retailer 0 or 1. All consumers with a lower 
value of z  will patronize retailer 0 ; they represent a share of 0 1[ ( 1 )]G z p p    of the total 
population. The consumers with z z  , who represent a share of 0 1(1 [ ( 1 )])G z p p     will 
buy from seller 1. Solving for z  yields  
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 0 10 1
( ) (1 )1( 1 )
2 2
v p v pz p p
t
          (3) 
Aggregate (market) demand for the two products is given by  
 0 0 1 0 0 1( 1 ) ( ) [ ( 1 )]
IX p p x p G z p p            (4) 
 1 0 1 1 0 1( 1 ) (1 )(1 [ ( 1 )])
IX p p x p G z p p            (5) 
Profits of the e-retailers are given by 
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 )
I Ip p p k r X p p             (6) 
 1 0 1 1 1 0 1( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 )
I Ip p p k r X p p             (7) 
 
The e-retailers simultaneously set their prices and the solution is given by the Nash 
equilibrium, denoted by the superscript NI . The equilibrium prices are then 0 1( )
NI NIp p , 
equilibrium demands are  
 0 0 0 1( 1 )
NI I NI NIX X p p      (8) 
 1 1 0 1( 1 )
NI I NI NIX X p p      (9) 
and equilibrium profits are  
 0 0 0 1( 1 )
NI I NI NIp p        (10) 
 1 1 0 1( 1 )
NI I NI NIp p        (11) 
 
The postal operator’s profits are given by  
 0 0 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
NI I NI NI I NI NIr c X p p r c X p p Y r F                 (12) 
where F  denotes the operator’s fixed cost and where ( )Y r  is the demand for single piece 
delivery services (by household and other small firms). Formally we have  
 ( ) argmax[ ( ) ]Y r S Y rY    
where ( )S Y  is the (aggregate) gross surplus of single-piece customers (other than e-retailers).  
2.2  Marketplace delivery 
In this case, referred to as subgame M , the utility of consumer z , who buys x  units of the 
good is given by 
 
2
0
2
1
( ) if the good is sold by firm 0
( ) (1 ) if the good is sold by firm1
u x p x tz
u x p x t z
 
 
      
 (13) 
where 1  , 1     and 1  . The parameter   represents the property that delivery 
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through the marketplace reduces the degree of horizontal product differentiation. It reduces the 
utility loss customers experience when patronizing a seller whose characteristics differ from 
their preferred ones. Consequently the goods become closer substitutes and price competition 
will be more intense. When 1  , marketplace delivery also increases the perceived quality of 
good 1; the seller now benefits from the reputation and warranties of the marketplace.  
 
Proceeding as above, the marginal consumer is now determined by 
 0 10 1
( ) ( )1( )
2 2
v p v pz p p
t
   
         
and aggregate (market) demand for the two products is  
 0 0 1 0 0 1( ) ( ) [ ( )]
MX p p x p G z p p              (14) 
 1 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( )(1 [ ( )])
MX p p x p G z p p               (15) 
 
Profits of the e-retailers are given by 
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
M M Mp p p k r X p p s r X p p                      (16) 
 1 0 1 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )
M Mp p p k s X p p               (17) 
where s  is the shipping rate retailer 0  charges to retailer 1.  
As in the case of independent delivery we assume that the e-retailers simultaneously set 
their prices and that the solution is given by the Nash equilibrium, denoted by the superscript 
NM . The equilibrium prices are denoted by 0 1( )
NM NMp p . Substituting into expressions 
(14)–(17) yields the equilibrium demands and profit levels, i.e. counterparts to expressions 
(8)–(11).  
Finally, the postal operator’s profits under marketplace delivery are given by  
 0 0 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
NM M NM NM M NM NMr c X p p X p p r c Y r F                    (18) 
Comparing equations (12) and (18) shows that the total sales of both retailers are now delivered 
at the rate 0r . The marketplace thus introduces a secondary market for delivery services which, 
even in the absence of bypass, restricts the operator’s ability to differentiate prices.  
2.3  Sequence of decision 
The timing of the “full game” consisting of delivery and retail pricing is as follows. In Stage 1 
the postal operator sets 0r  and r , to maximize welfare subject to the break-even constraint and 
anticipating the induced equilibrium. In Stage 2, retailer 0  chooses s , that is the rate at which 
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it is willing to sell its delivery service to the other retailer. In Stage 3, retailer 1 chooses 
independent delivery or marketplace delivery. Finally, in Stage 4 the retailers simultaneously 
choose their prices 0p  and 1p  in either the I  or M  subgame, which are described in 
Subsections 1 and 2 above.  
As usual we solve this game by backward induction to characterize the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. At each stage the players (operator or retailers) anticipate the impact their 
choices will have on the equilibrium in the subsequent stages. Though highly stylized, our 
model is too complicated to provide a full analytical solution. However, some analytical results 
can be obtained and in any event a thorough examination of the various stages is necessary to 
properly define the numerical solutions we will calculate in Section 4.  
3.  Equilibrium 
We start by studying the last stage of the game. At this point retailer 1 has already decided if it 
delivers independently or via the marketplace. Consequently, the retailers play subgame I  or 
subgame M . We shall examine them separately.  
3.1  Stage 4 
3.1.1  Subgame I  
At this point 0r  and r  are given and s  is of no relevance because the retailer has decided not 
to join the market place. The equilibrium of the price game yields the equilibrium prices, 
0 0( )
NIp r r , 1 0( )NIp r r , and profits, 0 0( )NI r r  , 1 0( )NI r r   as functions of the variables set in the 
earlier stages.  
3.1.2  Subgame M  
Once again, 0r , r  and s  are given. The equilibrium of the price game yields 0 0( )
NMp r r s  , 
1 0( )
NMp r r s   and the profit levels 0 0( )NM r r s    and 1 0( )NM r r s   . Observe that s  is now 
relevant and affects the equilibrium.  
Since we study the subgame perfect equilibrium, the comparative statics properties of 
these functions, in particular with respect to s  are relevant to analyze the earlier stages of the 
game. This is not a trivial exercise because we have to study the equilibrium and not just 
differentiate the profit functions. However, we can expect that  
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 1 0
( ) 0
NM r r s
s
      (19) 
in words, retailer 1’s profit decreases as the delivery fee by the other retailer increases. This is 
what can be considered the “normal” case which will arise in the numerical examples presented 
below. The formal analysis which we skip shows, however, that the results are not 
unambiguous but that it would take strong assumptions to obtain a different result.3  
Similarly we expect  
 0 0
( ) 0
NM r r s
s
      
for small levels of s  but for some 0( )s r r  we may have  
 0 0
( ) 0
NM r r s
s
      
In words, s  is the profit-maximizing level of s  for retailer 0 .  
3.2  Stage 3 
At this stage, retailer 1 will decide whether or not to join the marketplace. To do so it will 
compare 1 0( )
NI r r   and 1 0( )NM r r s   . When 1 0 1 0( ) ( )NI NMr r r r s     , the retailer will choose 
independent delivery. Otherwise it will join the marketplace.  
Note that for this comparison it is not sufficient to compare r  and s ; this is because 
quality level and degree of product differentiation differ between the two subgames.  
Assuming that (19) holds, there exists a critical level of s , 0( )s r r  such that  
 1 0 1 0( ) ( )
NI NMr r r r s       
For this level of s , retailer 1 is indifferent between marketplace and independent delivery. 
The equilibrium strategy of retailer 1 in the stage is then to choose I  if 0( )s s r r   and M  if 
0( )s s r r  . Note that we have assumed that in case of indifference retailer 1 chooses M .4  
                                                 
3 The direct effect of s  on 1 , even accounting for the induced increase in price is negative by the envelope 
theorem. However, as 1p  increases (the best-reply function of retailer 1 shifts upwards) 0p  will increase 
(prices are strategic complements) which has a positive effect on retailer1’s profit. 
4 This assumption is made for technical reasons. Since one of the possible strategies of retailer 0  may be to set 
s s   and we may have existence problems if we adopt the opposite assumption. 
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3.3.  Stage 2 
Retailer 0 , the potential marketplace, sets s , the delivery rate charged to the other retailer. 
This is achieved by comparing 0 0( )
NI r r   to 0 0( )NM r r s   , where 0( )Ms r r   is the solution to  
 
0 0
0
max ( )
s t ( )
NM
s
r r s
s s r r
  
    
 
In words, the retailer effectively faces two questions. First, what is the profit maximizing level 
of s  (denoted Ms ) which induces retailer 1 to join the marketplace? Second, how does the 
profit achieved with s  compare to the profit under independent delivery? While the choice 
between the two regimes is nominally made by the other retailer it is of course effectively 
controlled by retailer 0 , through the determination of s . Specifically, setting 0( )s s r r   will 
induce independent delivery while 0( )s s r r   results in a marketplace equilibrium.  
The results obtained for Stages 3 and 4 imply that s  is determined as follows. We have 
either 0 0 0( ) min[ ( ) ( )]
Ms r r s r r s r r       when there is an interior solution for the profit 
maximization in NM or 0 0( ) ( )
Ms r r s r r      when there is a corner solution. Operator 0  then 
sets the highest s  for which operator 1 chooses the M  subgame.  
The optimal level of s , 0( )s r r
   is then given by 0( )Ms r r   when 0 0( )NM Mr r s     
0 0( )
NI r r   or by some arbitrary level 0 0( ) ( )s r r s r r     otherwise. We assume that when 
operator 0  is indifferent between the two regimes, I  and M   it chooses the one preferred 
by the postal operator.  
3.4  Stage 0 
We are now in a position to state the problem of the postal operator who sets 0( )r r . As usual 
we consider a Ramsey problem where the postal operator maximizes welfare subject to a 
break-even constraint. Recall that this has profit maximization as a special case.5  
The operator’s pricing policy 0( )r r  will induce either the independent delivery or the 
marketplace equilibrium in the subsequent stages. Writing the objective function in a unified 
way for both regimes would complicate notation significantly. Consequently we write two 
separate problems, one for each regime. To determine the best policy one then has to compare 
                                                 
5 Formally the profit maximizing case is obtained by setting the profit target   at the monopoly level. Observe 
that in this case the Lagrange multiplier of the break even constraint will tend to infinity. 
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the level of the objective achieved at these solutions. Analytically this would be difficult but we 
address this issue in the numerical section.  
We now successively consider the postal operator’s problem in each of the two regimes. 
Recall that maximization is over 0( )r r .  
3.4.1  Regime I  
The Lagrangean expression associated with the postal operator’s problem is given by 
 
12 2
0 10
[ ( ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) (1 ) ] ( ) ( )
z NI NI
I z
L v p tz g z dz v p t z g z dz S Y           
 0 0 1 0(1 ) ( ) ( )
NI NI NI
I Ir r r r             
 0 0 0 0[ ( ) ( )]
NI NM M
I r r r r s          (20) 
 
Observe that the arguments of the functions 0
NIp , 1
NIp , 0X , 1X , Y  and 
Ms  have been 
dropped for simplicity. All these expressions are directly or indirectly functions of 0( )r r  and 
are determined in the subsequent stages, as shown in the previous subsections and by taking 
into account expressions (8)–(9).  
The condition associated with I , namely  
 0 0 0 0( ) ( ) 0
NI NM Mr r r r s         
is a Kuhn-Tucker constraint (it may or may not be binding), which ensures that the vector of 
rates 0( )r r  induce an equilibrium of type I  in the subsequent stages.  
3.4.2  Regime M  
The Lagrangean expression associated with the postal operator’s problem is now given by 
 
12 2
0 10
[ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ] ( ) ( )
z NM NM
M z
L v p tz g z dz v p t z g z dz S Y              
 0 0 1 0(1 ) ( ) ( )
NM NM M NM M
M Mr r s r r s                
 0 0 0 0[ ( ) ( )]
NM M NI
M r r s r r         (21) 
 
Once again the arguments of the various functions have been dropped for simplicity. All 
these expressions are directly or indirectly functions of 0( )r r  and are determined in the 
subsequent stages, as shown in the previous subsections.  
The condition associated with M , namely  
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 0 0 0 0( ) ( ) 0
NM M NIr r s r r        
is a once again Kuhn-Tucker constraint which may or may not be binding. It ensures that the 
vector of rates 0( )r r  induces an equilibrium of type M  in the subsequent stages.  
4.  Numerical illustrations 
In this section, we provide numerical simulations whose aim is to illustrate qualitatively the 
characteristics of the equilibrium obtained with reasonable values of the parameters. A 
calibration of our model to a specific postal market would require a sizeable amount of 
empirical work to estimate its various constituents. We leave such a calibration exercise for 
future research.  
We make use of the following values: 10k  , 1 1   , 25t  , 1 05   , 0 8    and 
0 5c   . We assume linear individual demand functions (obtained from quadratic utilities) 
which are such that (i) their direct price elasticity is 4.2 at a consumer price of 12, and (ii) that 
( 12) 10x   . We assume that the distribution of tastes, ( )G  , is uniform over [0 1] .  
We first describe the equilibrium in the model without bypass, before moving to its 
sensitivity to various assumptions, and finally to how it is affected by the introduction of bypass 
by firm 0.  
4.1  Benchmark results 
As in the previous sections, we solve the game by backward induction, starting with Stage 4. 
We first present the numerical results obtained in subgame I where firm 1 chooses independent 
delivery. Table 1 details the first-best allocation, where both r  and 0r  are set equal to their 
marginal cost, 0 5c   . The first row of Table 1 corresponds to the situation where firm 1 
delivers independently. The first-best retail prices are identical (since they both equal the same 
marginal cost 10 5k c   ) and result in a ( ˆ ˆ( )G z z ) 81.65% market share for firm 0, thanks 
to its higher quality ( 1 1   ). We assume away fixed costs for the moment, so that all three 
firms exactly break even, and total welfare is composed exclusively of consumer surplus, 
denoted by CS. The results presented in Table 1 will help us ascertain the welfare properties of 
the market equilibrium, to which we now turn.  
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Table 1 : First-Best allocation (benchmark) 
Subgame 0r  0p  1p  zˆ  0x  1x  0  1    CS  0 1CS        
I 0.5 10.5 10.5 0.816463 15.25 11.575 0. 0. 0. 25.732 25.732 
M 0.5 10.5 10.5 0.709274 15.25 13.5 3.924 s - 1.9624 3.924 s + 1.9624 0 28.247 28.247
Table  2 : Independent delivery equilibrium (benchmark) 
0r  0
NIp  1
NIp  zˆ  0
NIx  1
NIx  0
NI  1NI  NI  NICS  0 1NI NI NI NICS     
0.5 12.0543 11.9741 0.684553 9.81006 5.89984 10.4377 1.81283 0.930544 7.90251 21.0836 
0.55 12.0946 11.9807 0.677481 9.66894 5.87428 10.1179 1.85801 1.27481 7.62263 20.8733 
0.6 12.1348 11.987 0.670494 9.52815 5.85012 9.80527 1.90255 1.60268 7.3504 20.6609 
0.65 12.1749 11.9929 0.663597 9.3877 5.82727 9.49986 1.94643 1.9146 7.08569 20.4466 
0.7 12.215 11.9985 0.65679 9.24758 5.80563 9.20155 1.98963 2.21102 6.82832 20.2305 
0.75 12.2549 12.0039 0.650078 9.10782 5.78513 8.91025 2.03216 2.49237 6.57815 20.0129 
0.8 12.2947 12.0089 0.643461 8.96842 5.7657 8.62587 2.07401 2.7591 6.33503 19.794 
0.85 12.3345 12.0137 0.636943 8.82939 5.74726 8.34833 2.11517 3.01163 6.09882 19.5739 
0.9 12.3741 12.0182 0.630524 8.69076 5.72977 8.07751 2.15563 3.2504 5.86937 19.3529 
0.95 12.4136 12.0226 0.624208 8.55253 5.71316 7.81332 2.19539 3.47583 5.64655 19.1311 
1. 12.4529 12.0267 0.617995 8.41472 5.69738 7.55564 2.23444 3.68834 5.43022 18.9086 
1.05 12.4922 12.0306 0.611887 8.27735 5.68238 7.30439 2.27278 3.88834 5.22025 18.6858 
1.1 12.5313 12.0343 0.605886 8.14044 5.66811 7.05944 2.31041 4.07625 5.0165 18.4626 
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Table  3 : Marketplace equilibrium (benchmark) 
 
0r  s  0NMp  1
NMp  zˆ  0
NMx  1
NMx  0
NM  1NM  NM  NMCS  0 1NM NM NM NMCS     
0.5 1.6 12.23 12.5308 0.677033 9.19507 6.05357 12.9204 1.81989 0. 7.49796 22.2382 
0.6 1.59 12.2844 12.535 0.665284 9.00471 6.03844 12.0915 1.90994 0.801185 7.15758 21.9602 
0.7 1.58 12.3384 12.5383 0.653749 8.81567 6.02636 11.2786 1.99955 1.56997 6.83342 21.6816 
0.8 1.57 12.392 12.5408 0.642444 8.6281 6.01709 10.481 2.08861 2.30836 6.52513 21.4031 
0.9 1.57 12.4476 12.5509 0.632095 8.43345 5.98015 9.72386 2.15804 3.01235 6.20087 21.0951 
1 1.56 12.5004 12.552 0.621257 8.24863 5.97588 8.95625 2.24529 3.69392 5.92224 20.8177 
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Table 2 presents the market equilibrium with independent delivery by firm 1, as a 
function of the prices set by the postal operator, 0r  and r . More precisely, we assume from 
now on that r  is set exogenously at 1. As the reader will see, the results we obtain are already 
rich and complex, and would be made significantly more complex (especially to report) with 
the postal operator optimizing on two price dimensions at the same time. As a first pass, we then 
set r  exogenously and concentrate on the ratio between 0r  and r .  
Table 2 reports the equilibrium profit-maximizing price levels chosen simultaneously 
by firms 0 and 1 ( 0
NIp  and 1
NIp ) and the ensuing allocation as a function of the exogenous 
value of 0r  shown in the first column. Comparing with Table 1, we see that firm 0 makes use 
of its higher quality to raise its price above the one posted by firm 1, which results in a smaller 
market share than in Table 1, and in smaller consumer surplus and total welfare. As its input 
price 0r  increases, firm 0 increases its retail price and moves further away from the first-best 
optimal allocation. We also see that prices 0p  and 1p  are strategic complements, although 
1p  is much less sensitive to increases in 0r  than 0p . An increase in 0r  benefits firm 1 ( 1
NI  
increases) at the expense of firm 0 ( 0
NI  decreases) and of both consumer surplus and total 
welfare. A benevolent social planner would then set a value of 0r  below cost. The postal 
operator’s profit NI  increases with 0r , even when 0r  becomes larger than r . The intuition 
for this result is that a profit-maximizing postal operator would like to exploit the larger quality 
exhibited by firm 0, and that its only way to extract profit from firm 0 is to increase 0r .  
When the postal firm is maximizing welfare under a break-even constraint, the value of 
0r  it chooses is increasing in its fixed cost F . As the postal operator cannot set a value of 0r  
above 1r  , its profit-maximizing price is 0 1r  . We then see that the maximum value of the 
fixed cost compatible with breaking-even is 3.688.  
We now turn to the equilibrium with marketplace. The second row of Table 1 shows the 
first-best allocation in that case. First-best prices are not affected, but the market share of firm 0 
decreases to 70.93% due to the larger quality of the service offered by firm 1 when it uses firm 
0’s marketplace. The optimal quantity 1x , consumer surplus and total welfare are higher than in 
the first row, while the value taken by s  acts only as a transfer between firms 0 and 1.  
The value of s  is chosen at stage 2 by firm 0 in order to maximize its profit. We obtain, 
as surmised in Section 2, that 0
NM  is first increasing and then decreasing in s . We also obtain 
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that the profit-maximizing value of s  is much larger than 0r  and even than r , for all values 
of 0r r . The intuition for these results is that firm 0 anticipates that joining its marketplace 
will result in firm 1’s higher quality and thus higher profit, and that s  plays the role of an 
“access charge” to the marketplace. Also, increasing s  induces firm 1 to increase its retail 
price, decreasing the intensity of competition with firm 0. These two reasons concur in pushing 
the value of s  well above the marginal cost of delivery for firm 0 ( 0r ) and even for firm 1 ( r ). 
But firm 0 anticipates that it will realize this profit 0
NM  only if firm 1 accepts to join its 
marketplace, that is if firm 1’s profit with marketplace delivery is at least as large as with 
independent delivery. We obtain that 1
NM  is decreasing in s  (confirming equation (19)) and 
that this limit pricing constraint is binding for all values of 0r . In other words, the value of s  
which equalizes 1
NI  and 1NM  (denoted as 0( 1)s r  ) is smaller than the value of s  which 
maximizes 0
NM  (denoted as 0ˆ( 1)s r  ).  
We then report in Table 3 the equilibrium allocation attained in the marketplace for 
values of 0r  varying from 0 5c    to 1r  .6 By comparing Tables 2 and 3, we see that 
0 0
NM NI  , for all values of 0r . Table 3 then depicts the equilibrium allocation as a function of 
the value of 0r  chosen by the postal operator in the first stage of the game. We obtain that the 
postal operator’s profit is monotonically increasing in 0r . A profit-maximizing postal operator 
will then post 0 1r r  ; in other words it will not give any discount to firm 0. Both consumer 
surplus and total welfare are higher with the marketplace than in the subgame with independent 
delivery by firm 1.  
We now turn to the sensitivity analysis of these results.  
4.2  Sensitivity analysis 
We have studied the sensitivity of our results to variations in three assumptions: a larger 
exogenous value of r , a larger impact of joining the platform on the horizontal differentiation 
between the products offered by both firms (i.e., a lower value of  ) and on the quality of good 
1 (i.e., a larger value of  ).  
A natural question suggested by the numerical results presented in the previous section 
                                                 
6 We vary s  by increments of 0.01 in our computations. The value of s  reported in Table 3 are the highest for 
which 1 1
NM NI   holds. 
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is whether setting a higher exogenous value of r  (at 2.5 rather than 1) would result in an 
interior profit-maximizing value of 0r  for the postal operator (i.e., 0r r ). The answer is 
positive in the subgame where firm 1 delivers independently, with a profit-maximizing value of 
0r  of 2.35. At the same time, the only role played by r  in the subgame with marketplace is to 
degrade the outside option of firm 1, namely its profit level under independent delivery. The 
constraint that 1 1
NM NI   is then less binding when firm 0 sets its profit-maximizing level of 
s . We even obtain, for low values of 0r , that this constraint that 1 1
NM NI   is not binding at 
the level of s  which maximizes 0
NM  (i.e., 0 0ˆ( 2 5) ( 2 5)s r s r     ). The value of s  chosen by 
firm 1 is then much higher, for any value of 0r , than in the benchmark numerical results, and 
firm 0 makes much more profit with the marketplace than with independent distribution by firm 
1. Finally, the postal operator’s profit remains monotonically increasing with 0r  as long as 
0r r , and it makes more profit than when r  was set at one (so that Ramsey levels of 0r  are 
lower, for given F , when r  is increased to 2.5). Consumer surplus and welfare remain larger 
at equilibrium (with the marketplace) than in the subgame with independent delivery by firm 1.  
To summarize, a higher exogenous value of r  induces an interior profit-maximizing 
value of 0r  when firm 1 delivers independently, but not in the equilibrium situation where firm 
1 joins the marketplace, because it degrades the outside option of firm 1 and allows firm 0 to set 
a much higher level of the “access charge” s  to its marketplace.  
We now go back to the setting where 1r  , but assume that joining the marketplace 
decreases the degree of differentiation between products more significantly. Specifically we set 
0 5    rather than 0 8 . This change does not impact the equilibrium with independent 
delivery by firm 1, and thus its outside option. Less differentiation in the marketplace results in 
more intense competition, lower prices and lower profits for both firms for all values of 0r . We 
continue to obtain limit pricing by firm 0 (so that 1 1
NI NM  ), but with lower values of s  than 
in the benchmark numerical results. More precisely, as long as 0r  is low enough, 0 0
NM NI  , 
and firm 0 posts the highest value of s  compatible with firm 1 joining the marketplace, 
0( 1)s r  . When 0r  is large (although smaller than r ), 0 0NM NI   when 0( 1)s s r  , and firm 0 
posts a high value of s  ( larger than 0( 1)s r  ) to deter firm 1 from joining the marketplace. 
Turning to the postal operator, its profit is increasing in 0r  as long as firm 1 joins the 
marketplace, and becomes significantly lower when 0r  is large enough that the marketplace 
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does not form. We then observe some “double limit pricing” when the postal operator 
maximizes its profit: firm 0 posts the highest value of s  compatible with firm 1 joining the 
marketplace, 0( 1)s r  , and the postal operator sets the highest value of 0r  (strictly lower than 
1r  ) compatible with firm 0 finding it profitable for firm 1 to join the marketplace 
 0 0NM NI  . Both consumer surplus and aggregate welfare remain higher in the equilibrium 
with marketplace than in the subgame with independent delivery by firm 1.  
Finally, we assume that joining the marketplace allows firm 1 to bridge most of the 
quality gap between its product and firm 0’s (i.e., we set 1 09    while returning to 1r   and 
0 8   ). This does not affect the equilibrium with independent delivery and the outside option 
of firm 1. In the marketplace, firm 0 increases its price s  to very high levels up to the point 
where 1 1
NI NM  , and makes much larger profits than with independent delivery by firm 1. In 
other words, firm 0 can capture all the increase in firm 1’s profit generated by a larger   by 
increasing the access charge s  to the marketplace. The postal operator’s profit remains 
monotonically increasing in 0r . Interestingly, although total welfare remains higher with the 
marketplace than in the subgame with independent delivery, consumer surplus is lower: in 
equilibrium, firm 0 and the postal operator make larger profit, at the expense of consumer 
surplus, because higher equilibrium prices more than compensate the larger quality offered by 
firm 1 when it joins the marketplace. Intuitively, this occurs because only consumers who 
patronize seller 1 benefit from the higher quality, and they represent a small share, whereas all 
consumers support the price increase of both products.  
4.3 Introduction of bypass 
In this section, we revert to our original parameter values ( 1r  , 0 8    and 1 05   ) but 
allow firm 0 to bypass the postal operator and to deliver by itself part or all of its parcels. More 
precisely, and using the notation introduced in Appendix B, we assume for simplicity that 
1   and that 2( ) 12d Q Q  . Table 4 shows the first-best allocation, with its first row 
devoted to the situation with independent delivery. The only difference with the first row of 
Table 1 is that firm 0 makes a positive profit of 0.75, which corresponds to the delivery costs 
saved by bypassing the postal operator for parts of its volume. More precisely, when 0 0 5r   , 
firm 0 finds it more economical to deliver by itself 3 units of volumes (since 
0( ) 6
B Bd Q Q r     is satisfied for 3BQ  ). Consumer surplus is unaffected, compared to the 
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first row of Table 1, but total welfare is higher by 0.75.  
Table 5 reports the results obtained in the subgame with independent delivery by firm 1. 
We observe that 1 0 0( )
NId r X   as long as 0 0 95r   . In that case, the bypass size is affected 
exclusively by 0r  (and not by retail prices and volumes), so that we obtain the exact same 
equilibrium prices and volumes as in Table 2. The only difference with Table 2, for given 0r , is 
that 0
NI  is larger (thanks to the lower deliver costs of the bypass technology) while NI  is 
smaller (because of lower volumes delivered by the postal operator). When 0 0 95r   , we have 
that 1 0 0( )
NId r X   so that firm 0 delivers all of its sales, and the equilibrium is not affected by 
0r  anymore. Comparing with the case with no bypass, both equilibrium prices are lower 
(because firm 0 faces a lower marginal delivery cost, and because prices are strategic 
complements), firm 0’s profit is higher, while the postal operator’s and firm 1’s profits are both 
lower. We obtain numerically that the value of 0r  which maximizes the postal operator’s profit 
is 0.7. In words, the solution is interior and the price is lower than without bypass. The intuition 
is that an increase in 0r  decreases further the volumes delivered by the postal operator, 
compared to Table 2, because it induces a larger amount of bypass.  
Table 6 reports the marketplace equilibrium as a function of 0r . As long as 0 0 95r   , 
firm 1 chooses the same value of s  as without bypass, namely the value of 0( 1)s s r   
ensuring that 1 1
NI NM  . When 0 0 95r   , 1NI  is lower than without bypass, which allows 
firm 0 to post a higher value of 0( 1)s r   in the marketplace equilibrium. In both cases, 
0 0
NM NI  . The value of 0r  which maximizes the postal operator’s profit is lower than without 
bypass, and interior at 0 8 1r   . The intuition for this result is the same as with independent 
delivery by firm 1. Note that, for any given F  allowing the postal firm to break-even, the 
Ramsey value of 0r  is larger than without bypass, because bypass results in lower profits for 
the postal operator, for any value of 0r . In a nutshell, bypass results in postal operator’s profits 
which are both lower and more sensitive to the value of 0r  (because a higher value of 0r  
induces more bypass by firm 0).  
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Table 4 : First-Best allocation with bypass 
Suggame 0r  0p  1p  zˆ  0x  1x  0  1    CS  0 1CS      
I 0.5 10.5 10.5 0.816463 15.25 11.575 0.75 0. 0. 25.732 26.482 
M 0.5 10.5 10.5 0.709274 15.25 13.5 3.92481 s - 1.2124 1.9624 - 3.92481 s 0 28.247 28.997 
Table 5 : Independent delivery equilibrium with bypass 
 
0r  0
NIp  1
NIp  zˆ  0NIx  1NIx  0NIX  1 0' ( )d r 1NIX  0NI  1NI  NI  NICS  0 1NI NI NI NICS   
0.5 12.0543 11.9741  0.684553 9.81006 5.89984 6.7155 3. 1.86109 11.1877 1.81283 0.930544 7.90251 21.8336 
0.55 12.0946 11.9807 0.677481 9.66894 5.87428 6.55052 3.3 1.89457 11.0254 1.85801 1.10981 7.62263 21.6158 
0.6 12.1348 11.987 0.670494 9.52815 5.85012 6.38857 3.6 1.92765 10.8853 1.90255 1.24268 7.3504 21.3809 
0.65 12.1749 11.9929 0.663597 9.3877 5.82727 6.22965 3.9 1.96031 10.7674 1.94643 1.3296 7.08569 21.1291 
0.7 12.215 11.9985 0.65679 9.24758 5.80563 6.07372 4.2 1.99255 10.6715 1.98963 1.37102 6.82832 20.8605 
0.75 12.2549 12.0039 0.650078 9.10782 5.78513 5.92079 4.5 2.02434 10.5977 2.03216 1.36737 6.57815 20.5754 
0.8 12.2947 12.0089 0.643461 8.96842 5.7657 5.77083 4.8 2.05569 10.5459 2.07401 1.3191 6.33503 20.274 
0.85 12.3345 12.0137 0.636943 8.82939 5.74726 5.62382 5.1 2.08659 10.5158 2.11517 1.22663 6.09882 19.9564 
0.9 12.3741 12.0182 0.630524 8.69076 5.72977 5.47974 5.4 2.11701 10.5075 2.15563 1.0904 5.86937 19.6229 
0.95 12.3812 12.019 0.629378 8.66581 5.72672 5.45407 5.7 2.12244 10.5083 2.16285 1.06122 5.82872 19.5611 
1. 12.3812 12.019 0.629378 8.66581 5.72672 5.45407 6. 2.12244 10.5083 2.16285 1.06122 5.82872 19.5611 
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 Table 6 : Marketplace equilibrium with bypass 
 
 
0r  s  0NMp  1NMp  zˆ  0NMx  1NMx  0 1NM NMX X 1 0' ( )d r
 
0
NM  1NM  NM  NMCS  0 1NM NM NM NMCS     
0.5 1.6 12.23 12.5308 0.677033 9.19507 6.05357 8.18047 3. 13.6704 1.81989 0 7.49796 22.9882 
0.6 1.59 12.2844 12.535 0.665284 9.00471 6.03844 8.01185 3.6 13.1715 1.90994 0.441185 7.15758 22.6802 
0.7 1.58 12.3384 12.5383 0.653749 8.81567 6.02636 7.84987 4.2 12.7486 1.99955 0.729975 6.83342 22.3116 
0.8 1.57 12.392 12.5408 0.642444 8.6281 6.01709 7.69452 4.8 12.401 2.08861 0.868356 6.52513 21.8831 
0.9 1.57 12.4476 12.5509 0.632095 8.43345 5.98015 7.53087 5.4 12.1539 2.15804 0.852347 6.20087 21.3651 
1 1.6 12.5106 12.5847 0.624002 8.21306 5.85598 7.3268 6 12.0626 2.16822 0.663401 5.79715 20.6914 
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5.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the link between the delivery rates charged by parcel delivery 
operators and the e-commerce market structure. In particular, it has studied the impact of the 
parcel operators’ pricing strategies on the e-retailers’ incentives to develop a marketplace. It has 
considered a market where two e-retailers, a big one, 0, and a smaller one, 1 sell a homogenous 
good online.  
Initially, all parcels are delivered by a postal operator. However, 0 may or may not offer 
its competitors the option to join its marketplace through the payment of an access fee. 
Affiliation to the marketplace has several consequences for 1: (i) it reduces the degree of 
differentiation between the products, (ii) it increases the perceived quality of 1’s product which 
in turn increases the consumers’ willing to pay, and (iii) the marketplace consolidates the 
parcels send by 0 and 1 and could, in theory obtain better pricing conditions from the postal 
operator.7  
Under the assumptions made in the numerical simulations, we obtain that a marketplace 
will emerge in equilibrium. This is good news for consumers: their surplus increase since the 
perceived quality of 1’s product increases when it uses 0’s marketplace services. Compared to 
the case where 1 remains independent, the welfare is also higher: 0 makes higher profits, 1 is 
indifferent between both situations, and the postal operator sets the same price in both cases and 
makes higher profits when there is a marketplace since demand increases.  
The fact that the postal operator does not give any discount to 0 even though it is a 
bigger customer, with the more elastic demand, could appear counterintuitive in an industry 
characterized by scale economies and where volume discounts are a common practice. A 
sensitivity analysis shows that the latter result arises because the delivery rate charged to 1 is set 
at a rather low level. When it is fixed at a higher level, the postal operator concedes a discount to 
0 in equilibrium.  
Another sensitivity analysis shows that it is not always in the interest of 0 to offer its 
smaller competitor the possibility to join its marketplace. This is the case for instance if the 
affiliation to the marketplace reduces significantly the degree of differentiation between 
e-retailers products and therefore increases competition intensity, resulting in lower prices and 
lower profits for both firms. The result also emerges when 0’s competitive advantage on 
                                                 
7 We have not considered the case where joining the marketplace reduces the perceived quality of the small seller. 
In that situation 1 might nevertheless find it profitable to join the marketplace, but only if this one offers 
sufficiently low shipping rates.  
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delivery pricing (its bargaining power the postal operator) is not sufficiently important; in other 
words, when the discount offered by the postal operator to 0 is rather small. However, even in 
this case, it is in the interest of the postal operator to see a marketplace emerge, since this will 
have a positive impact on the volume of parcels to deliver. Consequently, the postal operator 
will set a price for parcel delivery such that 0 will find it profitable for 1 to join the marketplace.  
Finally, when joining the marketplace has a sufficiently large impact on the perceived 
quality of 1’s product, the emergence of a marketplace it is in the interest of both 0 and the 
postal operator. But, in this case, although total welfare remains higher with the marketplace 
than under independent delivery, consumer surplus is lower. As a matter of fact, only 
consumers who patronize 1 benefit from the higher quality, and they represent a small share, 
whereas all consumers support the price increase of both products.  
In the last section of the paper, we consider the case where 0 is able to bypass the postal 
operator and deliver by itself part or all of its parcels. In accordance with intuition, the degree of 
bypass will depend on the rate charged by the postal operator. When it is above a certain 
threshold, 0 will deliver by itself all its parcels. Face with the threatened, the postal operator 
will give 0 a higher discount compared to the case where bypass is not available. Not 
surprisingly, bypass decreases the postal operator’s profits. 
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Appendix 
A.  Examples of fulfillment fees for orders on Amazon.com 
Note that standard-size shipment, above $300, ordered on Amazon.com, are eligible for Zero 
Fee Fulfillment. Under $300, orders are subjected to fulfillment fees depending on their size 
and weight.  
For a CD (dimensions: 5.6" x 4.9" x 0.4"; unit Weight: 0.2 lb.; outbound Shipping 
Weight: 1 lb.), the Order Handling fee is set at $0.00, the Pick & Pack one at $1.02 and the 
Weight Handling fee at $0.46. The total fulfillment fee is equal to $1.48.  
For a book (Dimensions: 8.3" x 5.2" x 1.4"; Unit Weight: 0.4 lb.; Outbound Shipping 
Weight: 1 lb.), these fees are respectively set at $0.00, $1.02 and $0.55, for a total of $1.57.  
For a mobile device case (Dimensions: 13.8" x 9.0" x 0.7" ; unit Weight: 0.7 lb.; 
Outbound Shipping Weight: 1 lb.), the total fulfillment fee of $2.48 is composed of an Order 
Handling fee of $1.00 , a Pick & Pack fee of $1.02 and a Weight Handling fee of $0.46.  
For a Men’s Top Coat, the Order Handling fee is set at $0.00, the Pick & Pack one at 
$4.43, the Weight Handling fee at $2.51 (total $6.94).  
For a Ping pong table, the total fulfillment fee is set at $184.01 ($0.00 + $10.25 + 
$173.76).  
B.  Introducing bypass 
So far we have assumed that there is no bypass. Assume now that the retailer 0  can deliver by 
itself an exogenously given share, [0 1]    of its total volume Q  to be delivered, where 
0
IQ X  in case of independent delivery and 0 1M MQ X X   in case of marketplace delivery. 
The delivery cost associated with this bypass technology is given by ( )Bd Q ; we assume 
0d    and 0d   . For any given Q  firm 0 then chooses BQ  and PQ  to minimize delivery 
costs given by  
 
0 0( )
s t
B P
B P
B
D d Q r Q
Q Q Q
Q Q
 

 

 
We can have two types of solution: (i) Maximum bypass with BQ Q  which occurs when 
0( )d Q r   or (ii) partial bypass with BQ Q , when 0( )d Q r  ; BQ  is then implicitly 
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defined by 0( )
Bd Q r  .  
We can then define 10 0( ) min[ ( ) ]
BQ r d r Q   which represents the solution to this 
problem.  
Bypass does not modify the fundamental structure of the game but some expressions 
have to be modified. These are given in the following subsection.  
B.1  Modified expressions under bypass 
First, retailer 0 ’s profit has to be rewritten and equations (6) and (16) are replaced by 
 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( )
I I I BI BIp p p k X p p r X p p Q d Q                      
where  
 1 0 0 0 1min[ ( ) ( 1 )]
BI IQ d r X p p        (A1) 
and 
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
M M M
M M BM BM
p p p k X p p sX p p
r X p p X p p Q d Q
      
      
           
            
where 
 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1min[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))]
BM M MQ d r X p p X p p               (A2) 
 
Second, the postal operator’s profits are redefined as follows: 
 0 0 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
NI I NI NI BI I NI NIr c X p p Q r c X p p Y r F                      
in case of independent delivery and by  
 0 0 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
NM M NM NM M NM NM BMr c X p p X p p Q r c Y r F                     
in case of marketplace.  
Once the profit functions are redefined appropriately, the analysis presented in Section 
3 goes through without any modification.  
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